Larsen Law Offices v. David Larson by District of Colorado
  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF COLORADO 
 
 
Larsen Law Offices, LLC, a Colorado 
Limited Liability Company, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
vs. 
 
David M. Larson d/b/a Larson Law 
Office, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-1449-PBJ 
 
Hon. R. Brooke Jackson, U.S.D.J. 
 
 
 
 
EXPERT REBUTTAL REPORT OF PROFESSOR ERIC GOLDMAN 
 
1. I submit this expert report in support of the defendant, David M. Larson. This report 
responds to the report of Peter Kent dated January 13, 2017. 
 
I. Qualifications 
 
2. I am a professor of law at Santa Clara University School of Law in Santa Clara, 
California. I have been a full-time professor since 2002. I started my full-time academic career at 
Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin before moving to Santa Clara 
University in 2006. I was tenured and promoted to associate professor in 2008. I was promoted 
to full professor in 2012. 
 
3. In addition to my duties as a professor, I co-direct the law school’s High Tech Law 
Institute, the organization that administers the law school’s programmatic offerings related to 
intellectual property and high tech law. I have led (or co-led) the institute since 2006. U.S. News 
& World Reports has consistently ranked the High Tech Law Institute as one of the top 10 
intellectual property programs in the country. In 2016, U.S. News & World Reports ranked the 
program #6 in the country. 
 
4. At Santa Clara University, I have taught Internet Law, Intellectual Property, and 
Advertising & Marketing Law. I first taught Internet Law in 1996 (as an adjunct instructor). I 
first taught Intellectual Property in 2003. I first taught Advertising & Marketing Law in 2011. I 
have taught several other courses over the years. 
  
5. Before I became a full-time professor, I practiced Internet and technology law for eight 
years in the Silicon Valley. Initially, I practiced at the Cooley Godward law firm (now Cooley 
LLP) in Palo Alto from 1994-2000. From 2000-02, I was General Counsel at Epinions.com, a 
 2. 
 
consumer review website. I also have taught as an adjunct professor at UC Berkeley (Boalt Hall) 
School of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law, and University of San Francisco School 
of Law. 
 
6. With a co-author, I publish a casebook called Advertising & Marketing Law: Cases & 
Materials. It is the only Advertising Law casebook catering to law school courses. 
 
7. I have published on online trademark issues many times. In particular, I’ve written 
several academic papers about initial interest confusion or the application of trademark law to 
search engines, including: 
 
 Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005) 
 Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW 
AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
and Mark D. Janis eds.) (Edward Elgar Press, 2008)  
 Brand Spillovers, 22 HARVARD J. L. & TECH. 381 (2009) 
 Regulation of Lawyers’ Use of Competitive Keyword Advertising, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 
103 (co-authored with Angel Reyes III) 
 
8. Since 2005, I have published a popular blog, the Technology & Marketing Law Blog. In 
2016, the blog was inducted into the ABA Journal’s “Blawg 100” Hall of Fame. I have published 
approximately 600 blog posts on trademark topics.  
 
9. My professional recognitions include being named an “IP Vanguard” by the IP Section of 
the California State Bar, and being shortlisted as a North American “IP Thought Leader” by 
Managing IP magazine. 
 
10. I have attached my curriculum vitae, which includes a complete list of my publications. 
 
II. Compensation 
 
11. I am being paid $400 per hour, plus out-of-pocket expenses, for my expert work on this 
case. My compensation does not depend on the case’s outcome. 
 
III. Materials Reviewed 
 
12. I reviewed the following materials in preparing my opinion: 
 
 The complaint in this case filed June 14, 2016. 
 Expert Report of Peter Kent dated January 13, 2017 (the “Kent Report”). 
 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) 
 
I reference/cite additional materials in this report that I am aware of from my research activities, 
but I did not review them again. 
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IV. Past Testifying Expert Work 
   
13. Since 2013, I have testified or been deposed in four cases involving the Ohio Tax 
Commissioner’s efforts to collect a commercial activity tax from e-commerce retailers without a 
physical presence in Ohio: 
 
 Mason Companies v. Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, Case Nos. 2012-1169 
and 2013-2806 (Ohio Board of Tax Appeals).  
 Crutchfield v. Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, Case Nos. 2012-A-926, 
2012-A-3068 and 2012-A-2021 (Ohio Board of Tax Appeals). 
 Newegg v. Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2012-K-234 (Ohio 
Board of Tax Appeals). 
 L.L. Bean v. Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2012-A-158 (Ohio 
Board of Tax Appeals). 
 
In all of these cases, I was an expert on behalf of the taxpayer. 
  
I was also deposed in an online copyright case on behalf of the defendant: A.M. Best Company, 
Inc. v. SNL Financial LC, No. 11-1994 (D. N.J.). 
 
V. Opinion 
 
Testifying About Legal Matters 
 
14. The Kent Report repeatedly discusses and opines about legal matters. I believe legal 
matters (as distinguished from facts) are generally inappropriate for expert testimony. Because 
legal discussions and conclusions pervade the Kent Report, I cannot rebut the report without 
doing the same. I understand that testimony about legal matters should be struck from both 
reports. 
 
The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Is Functionally Dead 
 
15. For many years, I have maintained a Westlaw alert that notifies me of new cases using 
the term “initial interest confusion.” I review every notification. Over the past decade, I have 
blogged most of the significant rulings discussing initial interest confusion. 
 
16. In 2012, I published a blog post entitled “Talk Notes: Death of the Initial Interest 
Confusion Doctrine?” The post reported the tentative results of an empirical analysis of all initial 
interest confusion opinions from 1990-2011 (over 240 opinions). I found that plaintiffs 
frequently invoked the initial interest confusion doctrine but, starting around the latter part of the 
2000s decade, the doctrine succeeded in court rarely. While I have not subsequently updated my 
research comprehensively, I have monitored the Westlaw alert notifications, and the news has 
not gotten better for plaintiffs invoking the initial interest confusion doctrine. Courts rarely 
discuss the doctrine substantively, and even less frequently does a court rely upon the doctrine to 
rule for the plaintiff. Although the doctrine has not been definitively overruled, the courts’ 
treatment of the doctrine over the past decade indicates that it is functionally dead. 
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17. Over time, it has become exceptionally rare to see claims of initial interest confusion 
based on organic search results. Those few cases usually depend on a defendant’s use of 
misleading metatags, something not claimed by the Kent Report. As a result, this lawsuit’s 
assertion of initial interest confusion for simply appearing in organic search results (and online 
business directories) is unusual and irregular. 
 
The Kent Report’s Lack of Evidence Supporting the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine 
 
18. Courts do not have a single well-accepted definition of what constitutes “initial interest 
confusion.” For example, the Ninth Circuit has defined—and redefined—initial interest 
confusion at least a half-dozen times. The Kent Report says it consulted Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999), but 
that case’s discussion about initial interest confusion has been largely mooted by numerous 
subsequent initial interest confusion rulings from the Ninth Circuit. 
 
19. Sometimes, courts try to apply initial interest confusion to “bait-and-switch” situations, 
although the “initial interest confusion” nomenclature usually obscures that approach. Bait-and-
switch is not possible here because the litigants do not directly compete with each other. 
Prospective clients seeking business law services will not find any substitute offerings on David 
Larson’s website, so there is nothing for them to “switch” to. The Kent Report does not indicate 
that David Larson engaged in any bait-and-switch practices. 
 
20. In paragraph 77, the Kent Report quoted a definition of “initial interest confusion” from 
Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2006). The Kent Report’s reliance on 
this definition is problematic in several ways.  
 
21. First, the Australian Gold definition only applies to competitors. However, the Kent 
Report does not show that the plaintiff and David Larson are competitors.  
 
22. Second, the Australian Gold definition requires that consumers be “lured” to the 
competitor such that “competitor has captured the trademark holder's potential visitors or 
customers.” However, the Kent Report does not show that any consumer “luring” took place or 
that David Larson “captured” any potential visitors or customers. I’ll revisit the luring issue 
momentarily. 
 
23. Third, the Kent Report ignores the Tenth Circuit’s more recent ruling on initial interest 
confusion in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 
24. Like many initial interest confusion opinions, Lens.com does not provide a crisp 
definition of initial interest confusion. However, the court says: 
 
initial-interest confusion would arise as follows: a consumer enters a query for “1-
800 Contacts” on Google; sees a screen with an ad for Lens.com that is generated 
because of Lens.com’s purchase of one of the nine Challenged Keywords; 
becomes confused about whether Lens.com is the same source as, or is affiliated 
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with, 1-800; and therefore clicks on the Lens.com ad to view the site. Lens.com 
has exploited its use of 1-800’s mark to lure the confused consumer to its website. 
 
25. The Kent Report (paragraph 32) confirms that keyword advertising is not relevant to this 
case. 
 
26. The Kent Report does not provide any evidence that consumers were actually confused 
about whether David Larson’s website has the same source as, or is affiliated with, the plaintiff. 
 
27. The Kent Report only shows that search results for David Larson appear on the same 
page as search results for the plaintiff. However, the Lens.com opinion made it clear that a 
competitor appearing on the search results page (in that case, in form of the competitive keyword 
ads) for the plaintiff’s trademark is not sufficient to constitute “luring.” Lens.com said luring 
might occur when the consumer clicked on a link. The Kent Report does not provide any 
evidence that any consumer ever clicked on any of David Larson’s search results, whether for 
legitimate or illegitimate reasons. Therefore, the Kent Report provides no evidence to support its 
hypothesis in paragraph 47(3). 
  
28. The Lens.com opinion said that it would measure initial interest confusion based on 
clickthrough rates for the defendant’s keyword ads. The Kent Report does not provide any 
evidence of clickthrough rates on David Larson’s search results. 
 
29. In paragraph 47(2), the Kent Report discusses the possibility of searchers “mistakenly 
click[ing]” on David Larson’s search results; and in paragraph 78, the Kent Report says 
“Defendant’s actions could cause a consumer to accidentally go to Defendant’s site instead of 
Plaintiff’s.” These statements could have been tested empirically, but the Kent Report does not 
provide any evidence—empirical or otherwise—that any consumer has “accidentally” or 
“mistakenly” gone to David Larson’s site instead of the plaintiff’s. 
  
The Kent Report Does Not Provide Any Evidence of Consumer Search Objectives 
 
30. The implication that searchers might “accidentally” or “mistakenly” go somewhere from 
a search results page is misguided. Searchers do not randomly click on search results. Instead, 
searchers’ decisions about whether or not to click on a link are affected by the search results’ 
descriptions.  
 
31. The Kent Report does not consider how search results descriptions may educate 
consumers. Nevertheless, the report provides some evidence of how search results descriptions 
can educate consumers about the differences between the plaintiff’s website and David Larson’s 
website. For example, this Google screenshot comes from page 218 (part of Exhibit L) of the 
Kent Report (red arrows added): 
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32. Where indicated by the red arrow, David Larson’s website appears as the first organic 
search result and the plaintiff’s website appears as the second. Collectively, these search results 
make it clear that David Larson targets clients seeking estate planning services while the plaintiff 
targets clients seeking business law services. If consumers are actually seeking business law 
services, the search result descriptions guide them away from David Larson’s website and 
towards the plaintiff’s website. If consumers nevertheless decide to investigate David Larson’s 
website, they do so with a good idea of what to expect at his website—and a clear understanding 
that David Larson is not affiliated with or connected to the plaintiff. Therefore, as illustrated by 
its own exhibits, the Kent Report provides substantial evidence that its hypothesis in paragraph 
47(2) cannot be true, i.e., consumers seeing the search results as depicted in the Kent Report 
exhibits cannot “believe that Defendant’s Web site is Plaintiff’s Web site.” 
  
33. This highlights an intrinsic paradox in applying the initial interest confusion doctrine to 
search results. The doctrine simultaneously assumes prospective consumers are so brand-loyal 
that they only want to find the trademark owner; yet, that brand loyalty evaporates the moment 
these consumers see alternatives. The Kent Report does not address this paradox. For the search 
queries it conducted, the Kent Report does not provide any evidence of what consumers using 
those search queries would actually expect to see in their search results—or that seeing a search 
result for David Larson’s website wasn’t the consumers’ objective.  
 
34. In fact, some studies have shown that consumers expect—and want—to find results for 
more than just the trademark owner when they use the trademark as their search query. See, e.g., 
Jeffrey P. Dotson et al, Brand Attitudes and Search Engine Queries, 37 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 
105 (2016); David J. Franklyn & David Hyman, Trademarks as Search Engine Keywords: Much 
Ado About Something?, 26 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 481 (2013). The Kent Report does not explain 
how consumers can be confused if they expected to find multiple vendors in their search results. 
 
35. The Kent Report does not address what consumers are likely to do if they “accidentally” 
or “mistakenly” click on David Larson’s search results when they really are looking for the 
plaintiff. 
  
36. “Bounce rate” means the number of searchers who click on a search results link and then 
immediately leave the website. The Kent Report does not provide any evidence of the bounce 
rate for David Larson’s website or how that bounce rate compares to industry standards or other 
expectations. Because the David Larson website doesn’t offer business law services, it’s likely 
that consumers who were seeking the plaintiff will “bounce.” Searchers are used to “bouncing,” 
and they regularly “bounce” when a website does not meet the expectations set up by the search 
results descriptions.  
 
37.  “Pogo-sticking” occurs when consumers repeatedly bounce back and forth between the 
search results page and individual search results. Pogo-sticking by searchers is common. In other 
words, searchers have learned that they can easily correct any “accident” or “mistake” in 
investigating a search result by hitting the back button. Search engines consider pogo-sticking in 
their rankings algorithms as a signal that a search result isn’t meeting consumers’ needs and 
therefore should be downgraded in the search results ordering.  
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38. Search engines may interpret a consumer’s search query more broadly than the consumer 
expresses it. There are a number of reasons why search engines do this, including: 
 
 Consumers may make typographical mistakes when typing their search queries. 
 Consumers may not know how to spell a word (or, in this case, a person’s name) 
accurately. 
 The search engine may be uncertain about the consumer’s search objective. 
 The search engine may have observed that consumers searching for X are often also 
interested in Y, so the search engine shows results for both X and Y in response to 
queries for either X or Y. 
  
39. The following Google search results screen shot comes from page 210 (part of Exhibit L) 
of the Kent Report (red arrow added): 
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40. The red arrow highlights that Google unilaterally chose to include search results for 
“Larsen Law Offices” to the search results for “Larson Law Offices.” At the same time, Google 
disclosed that it commingled these results and gave users the option to un-commingle the results. 
 
41. Businesses indexed in search engines cannot control if and when search engines 
commingle results like this. Instead, commingled search results reflect the search engine’s 
editorial decisions about what information it thinks would be most helpful to its users. Therefore, 
paragraph 65 of the Kent Report is incorrect when it claims that David Larson is “causing the 
search engines to include Defendant’s Web pages with Plaintiff’s mark.” 
 
42. The Kent Report frequently refers to the relative search results placement of the 
plaintiff’s website and David Larson’s website (see, e.g., Paragraphs 62-64). The ordering of 
search results depends on hundreds of factors. Search engines frequently change these factors 
and the relative weight assigned to them, so the order and relative positions of search results 
changes constantly. Therefore, the positions of search results indicated in the Kent Report reflect 
only a snapshot in time, and they have likely changed multiple times since the report was drafted. 
Furthermore, search engines may customize search results for individual searchers based on the 
searcher’s geography, past search history and other factors. 
 
The Plaintiff Does Not Have Any “Trademarks,” And David Larson Did Not “Use” Them 
 
43. The Kent Report assumes in paragraph 46 that “Larsen Law Offices” and “Larsen Law” 
are protectable trademarks. However, “Law Offices” and “Law” are dictionary terms for the 
applicable services offered by both David Larson and the plaintiff, and “Larsen” is the plaintiff’s 
last name, which trademark law treats the same as a descriptive term. Therefore, to be 
protectable trademarks, the terms “Larsen Law Offices” and “Larsen Law” would need to 
achieve secondary meaning. 
 
44. The Kent Report does not provide any evidence that the purported trademarks have 
achieved secondary meaning. The Kent Report does not show that any consumers associate the 
purported trademarks with any single provider in the marketplace.  
 
45. However, the Kent Report shows that several other vendors use the name “Larsen Law 
Offices” or “Larson Law Offices” in the Denver and Colorado marketplaces; and these other 
vendors appear in local search results for various search queries related to the purported 
trademarks. This provides evidence that consumers do not associate the purported trademarks 
exclusively with the plaintiff’s business. 
 
46. The Kent Report repeatedly and conclusorily asserts that David Larson “used” the 
plaintiff’s purported trademarks (examples include paragraphs 50-53 and 55-56). However, the 
Kent Report does not attempt to distinguish between David Larson’s purportedly illegitimate 
“use” of the plaintiff’s purported trademarks and David Larson’s legitimate use of his own name 
to advertise his professional services. 
 
47. For example, paragraphs 65-75 of the Kent Report enumerate a variety of ways 
consumers may learn about David Larson’s services. All of the discussed activities are legitimate 
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business practices to inform consumers about the availability of marketplace offerings. The Kent 
Report does not suggest that any of these activities are intended to, or actually, deceive 
consumers or “game” the search engines. None of the practices described in the Kent Report 
constitute “black hat” or “gray hat” search engine optimization practices. 
 
Dated: March 6, 2017 [signed] 
       Prof. Eric Goldman 
 
Attachment: Eric Goldman Curriculum Vitae 
